

BACKGROUND

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NACP HISTORY

I. Project Description

A. Background

The NACP was authorized on December 12, 1989, as a 42 month Project. The LOP funding level was \$12.5 million. On May 17, 1990, a technical assistance contract was signed with DAI for \$11.2 million (T.A. - \$3.8 million; Logistical Support - \$750,000; Program Costs - \$6.7 million.) The project was redesigned (to eliminate crop substitution and development aspects) and eventually discontinued because of Congressional concerns, discussed in Article II below. The DAI contract was terminated effective January, 1992.

B. Project Description

- The NACP had three project components, which are described below:

1. Narcotics Awareness - The objective of the awareness component was to disseminate the message of the social degradation caused by the use of narcotics, and to draw the connection between narcotics production and increased drug addiction in Afghanistan. Themes aimed at users (including those in refugee camps), on the one hand, and growers, on the other, were to be developed.

The awareness component targeted local political and military leaders in resistance areas, religious figures, and the donor community as vehicles for implementation of this project component. The messages would be delivered through religious messages in mosques, to school children through educational materials, to refugees living in camps through traveling teams, to mujahideen through literacy programs and health clinics, and to all Afghans through radio, print and poster media and via traveling teams.

2. Poppy Elimination - AID/Rep would negotiate seven to eight poppy elimination plans with commanders or local shuras under which development resources would be provided in exchange for a poppy ban. The elimination plans would contain a timetable for the elimination of poppy and for the provision of assistance. Funds would also be provided to certain PVO's for poppy elimination programs.

Most of the assistance to be provided by AID/Rep was to have been of an agricultural nature, although education, health and other types of

assistance might also have been made available if there was a strong demand in the community and evidence that these interventions would contribute to poppy elimination. Assistance would be phased so that in the first year no inputs would be provided which would facilitate poppy cultivation.

In most cases, the project would seek to return areas to their pre-war agricultural status, promoting the cultivation of wheat, fruit trees, grapes and/or vegetables. In limited instances, the project would experiment with the cultivation of higher value crops, such as cumin, caraway and licorice.

The target areas would be primarily low intensity areas of poppy cultivation. All activities would be viewed as pilot projects to be monitored for development of subsequent activities. Areas of project implementation would be selected on the basis of the following criteria:

- a local authority with the ability and the will to enforce a poppy ban exists;
- the area is not a traditional or high intensity poppy growing area, or, if it is, exceptional circumstances exist which make poppy elimination a likelihood;
- the area is in great need of development inputs, and there is no other donor assistance being provided in the area under different terms which could jeopardize the success of either activity;
- there are no processing labs or drug lords that control production or processing in the area, and there is no poppy futures market.

Enforcement of the poppy ban was acknowledged to be crucial to project success. The poppy elimination sites would be selected in areas where the local authority had the ability to enforce the agreed upon ban. The project would not provide local leader with the training or physical means of enforcement, but by making alternatives to poppy cultivation possible, would legitimize the enforcement actions of local leaders.

3. Research and Information

Under this project component, the following activities would be carried out:

- monitoring and evaluation - collation of information on the success of poppy elimination plans; provision of design guidance to NGO's; development of consistent narcotics policy among donors;
- research on high value crops;
- research on the determinants of poppy cultivation; and
- preparation for future narcotics operations in Afghanistan - looking toward the eventual sharing of enforcement authority with more regionalized or centrally established authority and working with the NAU in Afghanistan.

II. Problems Encountered by NACP

A. Congressional Concerns - A number of objections to the NACP were raised by Congress, primarily Committee on Foreign Affairs members Stephen Solarz (New York) and Larry Smith (Florida). The following concerns were raised about the NACP:

- A.I.D.'s lacks legal authority to conduct the project as A.I.D. is authorized only to provide humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and a crop substitution program is not humanitarian aid;
- objections were raised about the use of a contractor to implement the project, about the high technical assistance costs of the contract, and about A.I.D.'s execution of a TA contract before development of an implementation plan;
- because A.I.D. has no access inside Afghanistan, it could not effectively control or monitor how the aid was being utilized;
- project goals were unclear, including what statistical measures would be employed to gauge the project's success;
- it was not clear how enforcement would be handled;

- A.I.D.'s ability to insure compliance with Section 487 (dealing with drug traffickers) was questioned;
- the NACP was perceived as having a "crop substitution" component, an intervention categorically condemned as ineffective.

It appears that Congressional attention to the NACP was triggered by an article in the Washington Post about A.I.D.'s dealings (and alleged offer of aid) to Afghan rebel leader Naseem Akunzada, who was reputed to have controlled opium production in the upper Helmand Valley in Afghanistan. Serious objections to these alleged contacts (on the basis of Section 487) were apparently at the heart of Congressional antagonism to the NACP.

The Mission was instructed not to proceed with the crop/income substitution activities until an implementation plan was developed in consultation with AID/W (State 285915) for approval by the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The project proceeded for a time with only the awareness and research and information components, but in the face of continued AID/W and Congressional obstacles, was ultimately terminated in January of 1992.

RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS

FAA Section 481(h)(5) - Presidential Certification

No bilateral assistance funds¹ may be obligated, and previous obligations for assistance may not be expended, for major narcotics or transiting countries (which includes Afghanistan) when the President has failed to make a certification by March 1 of that year that the country is cooperating fully with the United States under a bilateral narcotics agreement, or has taken adequate steps on its own under a multilateral agreement, to control narcotics production, trafficking, money laundering, and corruption, and to increase drug education and treatment programs. Alternatively, the President may, by March 1, certify that it is in the vital national interests of the United States that assistance be furnished to that country. In 1992, Afghanistan was not certified on either ground.

If the President fails to make the certification on one of the two grounds specified above before March 1, such certification may be made at a later date but, as a condition to the effectiveness of such later certification, FAA section 481(h)(6)(A)(ii) requires that Congress enact a joint resolution approving the determination made in the certification.

Under certain cases, the requirements of Section 481(h) may be waived as provided under FAA Section 614(a), discussed below.

FAA Section 483

No assistance funds may be used to reimburse persons whose illicit drug crops are eradicated.

FAA Section 487

Prohibits assistance to or through any person where it is known or there is reason to believe that such person has been convicted of a narcotics violation or is or has been an illicit trafficker or knowing assistor, abettor, conspirator or colluder in the illicit trafficking in any controlled substance.

Regulations have not yet been promulgated under Section 487 but are expected to be issued soon. These will provide specifics on what must be done to comply with Section 487.

¹Excluded from the Section 481(h) prohibition are the following types of assistance: disaster relief assistance; assistance involving the provision of food or medicine; assistance for refugees; and assistance from the Child Survival Fund of FAA section 104(c)(2).

Comment: An Embassy Narcotics Working Group, chaired by the DCM, was established to determine whether a potential U.S. foreign aid recipient was in violation of the above provision (ref: State Cable 144447). AID/W has advised that when in doubt as to whether Section 487 is applicable Mission should err on the side of caution. In the case of questionable individuals, AID/W should be consulted prior to any dealings with them. No commitments, direct or indirect (e.g. asking what kind of assistance they require), should be made until the Mission's Narcotics Working Group has made the Section 487 determination (State 285915).

Section 536 of the 1991 Appropriations Act²

Assistance may be made available for the provision of food, medicine or humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people, notwithstanding any other provision of law.

Comment - this section has been interpreted to allow a certain amount of bilateral programming of food, medicine and humanitarian assistance under conditions insuring delivery to the Afghan people without a waiver under FAA Section 614(a) or certification under Section 481. Note that AID/Rep's authority to conduct the crop/income substitution components of the NACP was challenged by Congress on the basis that it did not involve "humanitarian" aid.

FAA Section 614(a) - Waiver Provision

Notwithstanding any other provision of the Act (including Section 481 - Presidential Certification and Section 620 - Prohibition on Assistance to Afghanistan), the President may authorize the furnishing of assistance to any country if he makes a determination that to do so is important to the security interest of the United States, and so notifies in writing the Speaker of the House and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

FAA Section 620D - Prohibition on Assistance to Afghanistan

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated under the Foreign Assistance Act may be used to furnish assistance to Afghanistan until the President certifies to the Congress that-

- (1) the Government of Afghanistan has apologized officially and assumes responsibility for the death of Ambassador Adolph Dubs; and

²This Act still applies pursuant to the Continuing Resolution for FY 1992 (P.L. 102-145, as amended by P.L. 102-206)

- (2) the Government of Afghanistan agrees to provide adequate protection for all personnel of the United States Government in Afghanistan.

This requirement shall not apply if the President determines that such assistance is in the national interest of the United States because of substantially changed circumstances in Afghanistan.

USG NARCOTICS STRATEGY

I. NATIONAL STRATEGY

President Bush has stated that "It is imperative for our own well-being and the development of democratic and economically stable governments around the world that the problem of narcotics be dealt with aggressively" (State 200363).

The President's first National Drug Control Strategy, issued in September 1989, established a ten-year objective of reducing by 50 percent the quantities of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and other dangerous drugs entering the United States. Successive annual strategies, amplifying on this first strategy, have been issued in each of the four subsequent years.

The U.S. International Heroin Control Strategy, which is a component of the overall narcotics strategy, identifies the following objectives with respect to heroin producing countries:

- to promote heroin control programs in international and multilateral fora;
- to garner worldwide recognition of the drug issue in both its health and national security dimensions through bilateral initiatives as well as regional relationships;
- to strengthen supply reduction programs;
- to strengthen the ability of cooperating opium-producing and heroin-refining countries to disrupt narcotics trafficking organizations through prosecution, punishment and extradition of traffickers;
- to disrupt drug money laundering activities;
- to interdict the transit routes for heroin and precursor chemicals; and
- to support demand reduction initiatives that have the effect of stimulating national drug control efforts.

II. A.I.D. STRATEGY

Administrator Roskens underscored the "critical role we must play in the international war on drugs. U.S. foreign policy interests in this area should be reflected in A.I.D. strategies of the designated narcotics producing and trafficking countries requiring

presidential certification." (State 200863)

A.I.D. Strategy is to be in the forefront of the current international war on drugs. The focus of A.I.D. efforts is to stimulate broad-based, sustainable economic growth; develop sound macro-economic policies; create economically viable alternative development programs; foster improved administration of justice programs; and create the political will and institutions for countries to confront the consequences of production, trafficking and use through support for drug education and awareness programs (State 200863).

A.I.D. should explore the use of program or project conditionality in connection with country narcotics strategies. The country team should be creative in developing conditionality which reflects realistic opportunities to implement legal, procedural, and programmatic actions which support host country national narcotics plans (State 200863).

A poppy ban clause, macroeconomic reform, or legal initiative to help the host country address its drug problems are possible ways to contribute to the international drug control effort. Complimentary law enforcement efforts are essential for the effective use of economic assistance (State 200863).

The development of baseline data, and effective program monitoring, feedback and evaluation are key to success in implementing the alternative development counter-drug strategy.

History

A.I.D. has supported counter-narcotics efforts in Asia and Latin America since the mid-1970's, initially through crop substitution efforts and later with targeted area development programs in Pakistan, Thailand, Bolivia and Peru.

A.I.D. began supporting narcotics awareness/prevention projects in 1985.

The multi-agency Andean counter-drug initiative of 1990 proposes nearly one billion dollars in balance of payments and program assistance between FY 1990 and FY 1994 to help Bolivia, Colombia and Peru reduce dependence on coca revenues and revitalize their economies as their enforcement efforts take effect [current status and progress?].

A.I.D.'s narcotics control efforts in Afghanistan began in the mid-1970's, when it was discovered that agricultural tracts in the Helmand Valley, which had been supported by A.I.D., were growing poppy. In response, A.I.D. began the use of "poppy clauses" in its assistance contracts, a practice which later spread worldwide (Islamabad 013952). My review of the Retrospective Review of US

Assistance to Afghanistan: 1950-1979 did not reveal any program activities specifically geared toward elimination of narcotics.

A.I.D.'s major past effort to reduce poppy production was the Narcotics Awareness and Control Project, which is summarized in a separate document.

Relationship to Other Agencies

A.I.D. participates in the Policy Coordinating Committee for Counter-Narcotics co-chaired by the National Security Council and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. A.I.D. works closely with the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM), which is responsible for coordination of USG counter-narcotics programs overseas (State 200863).

A.I.D. alternative development programs must be closely coordinated with INM assistance programs and USG law enforcement efforts at the field level. Narcotics awareness/prevention programs should be closely coordinated with INM and USIA.

III. A.I.D. PAKISTAN STRATEGY

A. Overview of A.I.D. Activities.

USAID Pakistan's counter-narcotics activities began in the early 1980's. These activities are encompassed in the Northwest Frontier Area Development Project (NWFADP) and the Tribal Areas Development Project (TADP). The NWFADP, scheduled to end in August, 1993, is funded at \$54.9 million (reduced from \$63 million due to the Pressler amendment). The TADP, scheduled to end in September, 1994, is funded at \$527 million (reduced from \$47 million).

The NWFADP consists of three components: the Gadoon-Amazai Area Development Project (summarized in detail in Appendix A hereto); the Kala Dhaka Area Development Project (KDADP), a project whose area lies adjacent to Gadoon-Amazai; and the Drug Abuse Prevention Resource Center (DAPRC). The Gadoon-Amazai component was designed to change the area economy of the major opium poppy producing area of the NWFP from one based on poppy cultivation to a diversified agricultural and non-agricultural system with strong ties to the national economy. The KDADP is a similar effort begun in an area adjacent to Gadoon-Amazai. The DAPRC focuses on the demand reduction side of the narcotics problem, working through NGO's and a Resource Consultant Network.

While A.I.D.'s efforts have been successful in the targeted areas, there are concerns regarding (1) the sustainability of these successes in the long term following the inevitable reduction of the substantial subsidies involved (which will

accelerated due to cutbacks mandated by the Pressler amendment); (2) the replicability of project successes elsewhere due to the high cost of the project activities; and (3) whether eradication efforts in the project areas have pushed production into other areas.

B. Lessons Learned.

USAID's decade-long experience in Pakistan has led to the conclusion that project success is impossible without linkage between development, enforcement, and demand reduction interventions. In addition, the following conclusions have been drawn regarding a successful poppy elimination program:³

1. a strong government commitment is required; this entails policies and coordinated strategies at the national, provincial, and local levels;
2. a long-term commitment to research, planning, and development is required to bring about change in the technical and economic skills and social attitudes of farmers;
3. only an integrated multi-sectoral development program, not isolated demonstration and crop substitution projects, will be successful;
4. promotion and coordination through a centralized masterplan and organization makes the project more attractive to donors and international organizations;
5. it is necessary to initiate preemptive development interventions in remote poppy areas to prevent the "balloon effect".

C. Current Project Goals.

Unfortunately, the Pressler amendment dictates that USAID's anti-narcotics program come to a close in the near future. This will undoubtedly jeopardize the considerable successes which the project has achieved. The following project goals are geared toward ensuring sustainability to the maximum extent possible following close-out of USAID operations:

1. promotion of private enterprise and regional economic growth for the reduction and elimination of poppy cultivation;

³The source for these conclusions is a USAID Pakistan strategy document entitled: Counter-Narcotics Program 1991

2. reorientation of area development projects through indigenous NGO's in which interventions emphasize the elimination of subsidies, increased local contribution and participation, data base planning and monitoring, and private sector enterprise;
3. institutionalize the USAID area development projects within the Government of the NWFP through the development of leadership, organization, and management skills; and
4. promote regional development framework through the institutionalization of a planning methodology, research and evaluation, and training.

APPENDIX A

Project Alpha

Project Alpha was a pilot narcotics control program initiated in the fall of 1988, conducted under the Commodity Export Program (CEP). The project was developed as a result of a request for assistance from a Mujahideen commander [IDENTITY?] in Nangarhar Province. It involved the supply of food and agricultural inputs to support this commander's efforts to curtail poppy cultivation within his area of control.

A.I.D.-financed assistance included the provision of farm implements (two tractors, two plows, two trailers, two cultivators, and two threshers); 600 metric tons of wheat; 47,000 Kg. of sugar, and 104,000 Kg. of ghee. The total value of the assistance inputs was \$159,264. Inputs were provided from November, 1988, through March, 1989, (except for the threshers, which were supplied in June of 1989). The wheat was intended for use as seed, but because of delays in project start-up, the wheat arrived after the main planting season. As a result, virtually all of the wheat was consumed as food.

In late spring of 1989, the commander informed AID/Rep officials that there had been no poppy production in areas under his control. No Americans or other independent monitors were deployed to verify this statement prior to harvest season. A VITA team was sent in to the area in September of 1989 concluded that while there had been no poppy production in areas directly under the commander's control, there remained some growing and harvesting of opium in adjoining areas less subject to his influence. It is not clear what sources VITA relied on, since there would have been no physical evidence of the poppy crop at the time of their mission. The boundaries of the area "directly under the commander's control" are also not clear in the record.

It was intended that follow-on activities be continued under the auspices of the NACP, which was then under design. When obstacles to implementation of the NACP arose, Project Alpha fell by the wayside.

APPENDIX B

Gadoon-Amazai Project

The purpose of the Gadoon-Amazai project, begun by USAID Pakistan in 1983, was to change the area economy of the major opium poppy producing area of the NWFP from one based on poppy cultivation to a diversified agricultural and non-agricultural system with strong ties to the national economy. Very little progress in reducing areas under poppy cultivation was made for the first three years of the project. Over the next four years, however, due to determined enforcement by the GOP (which resulted in the shooting deaths of 13 villagers) the goal of eliminating poppy cultivation in the Gadoon-Amazai area was successfully accomplished.

The development aspects of the project included a broad spectrum of activities and training in sectors such as agriculture, horticulture, animal health care, afforestation, and livestock. The training component included off-farm training, teacher training, construction of women's centers and schools for girls. Infrastructure activities encompasses building or upgrading roads, schools, irrigation, health, and water supply systems.

Some one thousand (1,000) sub-projects were undertaken in connection with this project, including the following¹:

- 74 miles of roads;
- 153 schools;
- 9 health facilities;
- 16 veterinary dispensaries;
- 40 electrified villages;
- 300+ irrigation systems;
- 163 potable water supplies;
- 50% increase in agricultural production due to high-yielding crop varieties and fertilizer;
- 2,000+ local residents trained in technical skills;
- 3,000+ local residents placed in new jobs; and
- Rs. 400,000,000+ moved through the local economy because of subsidies, cash payments, and employment generation.

The Gadoon Industrial Estate, partially supported by USAID, was constructed by the GOP to attract industry to the area and thereby generate employment and economic activity.

A 1990 Evaluation of the Project contained the following conclusions:

¹ Use statistics are as of 1990, and need to be updated.

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1. A combination of enforcement and development - within a unique framework of cooperation between the GOP and USAID - has been necessary and successful in eliminating poppy production.
2. The task of opening up the project area to development has been accomplished.
3. Crop subsidies, orchard and forest payments, and infrastructure development involving little or no community participation, have become a liability rather than an asset that have created a dangerous welfare syndrome that undermines rather than builds sustainability and self-reliance.
4. The sustainability of most development activities, including the maintenance and operation of many facilities, is in jeopardy due to weak linkages with key line agencies and lack of active community participation at the beneficiary level.
5. Even with the completion of the 600 sub-projects in the pipeline, many of which have benefitted relatively few people, the Gadoon-Amazai area will still lag behind the adjacent Swabi lowlands in terms of basic infrastructure and social services.

The Evaluation Team recommended that the following measures be taken:

1. Continue and accelerate the process of systematic phase-out of subsidies and major infrastructure development, consistent with completing the 600 approved sub-projects, in order to break the cycle of dependency before it becomes entrenched.
2. Initiate a parallel but independent process of grassroots, self-reliant development built around sustainable village organizations that provide for broad-based community participation.

The Evaluation Team offered the following lessons learned for testing in comparable future projects:

1. A social development component built around a village level organization scheme with more direct recipient involvement should be included from the project inception.
2. The phase-out of subsidies should begin early,

particularly if a social organization team is in place to facilitate the development of self-help activities.

3. The level of subsidies provided in this project should not be as high in future endeavors.

APPENDIX C

UNDCP Anti-Narcotics Program

Based on August 5, 1992 Interview with Andy Pryce

The Peshawar office is the only project office for Afghanistan

- not in UNDCP mandate to deal with law enforcement officials.
- a rural program, with an agricultural emphasis.
- the first Afghanistan program (office established November 1989, but didn't actually begin any project work until the spring of 1990) (time viewed in terms of crop years, e.g. 1990-91 crop year) (operating window essentially closes in November with the end of planting).

Office in Kabul - in-country "field advisor" (Chris Conrad in that position and in Kabul for one year, although he spent about 60% of his time in Pakistan). Policy position, responsible for liaison with government offices and ministries, and donors. A replacement for Conrad is expected by the end of September. (Field advisor for UNDCP Pakistan program is Ralph Secombe, stationed in Islamabad).

The Peshawar project office has two broad categories of projects - supply reduction (cross-border) and demand reduction.

Supply reduction programs:

- often funds NGOs to implement the projects.
- projects are often "multi-sectoral".
- objective is generally "crop substitution", although prefers not to use that term and believes that that concept is too simplistic.
- prefer to work with the community, rather than directly with the farmer. The community must have incentives to cultivate crops other than poppies. Also try to avoid the term "compensation" because that smacks of a deal ("incentive is all wrong"). Examples of working through the community include funding schools, clinics, irrigation systems, agricultural projects, roads, etc.).
- principal target is opium poppy cultivation, although mandate is for "illicit crops".
- UNDCP now working in four provinces (Helmand,

Badakhshan, Nangarhar, and Kunar) (most of the projects in Nangarhar and Badakhshan) and expects to be in six or seven by next year.

(Kunar, which used to have substantial poppy cultivation, has virtually eliminated it. How? 1) Salafi policy of banning cultivation; 2) effective projects by donor agencies (proximity to Pakistan lets it be a major recipient of donor aid - significant long-term projects by DACAAR, SCA, Madera, and ARCON (?), FAO seed multiplication and forestry projects); 3) UNDCP program has also made a "small contribution").

Projects:

- UNDCP funding Madera project in Kashkot (sp?) - bringing water to six villages which have not had supply for 10 years.
- terms of reference include rural electrification (no projects yet), education (building and running four schools in), funding and construction of clinics (now funding the running costs of a clinic in Nangarhar), repair of irrigation channels, general agricultural programs.
- avoiding distribution of fertilizers (a Pryce decision for two reasons: 1) difficult to monitor; 2) can go astray and lead to embarrassment if used on the wrong crops).
- starting to finance a seed multiplication project (where?).
- apiculture - a bee project run through Afghanaid
 - provides both cross-pollination and income-generation
 - located at Jerm (?) in Badakhshan
 - Bob Mangham is Afghanaid bee expert
 - hives flown to Faizabad on UN plane; bees sent by road.
- funded seven fruit projects with FAO in Nangarhar (when fully bearing, there's potential for one jerib of fruit trees to yield more money than one jerib of opium poppy)

UNDCP says publicly that it does not limit its activities to poppy-growing areas, although in fact it works only in poppy areas and sectors immediately bordering them (don't want to encourage people to start growing poppies to get UNDCP funds and projects). An exception - the "fire break" effect - will sometimes fund projects in an immediately adjacent area (e.g. area at mouth of Kunar valley to keep poppy from moving in from

Nangarhar).

UNDCP can threaten that if poppies continue to be grown in a project area, they will terminate their efforts and encourage other groups to withdraw as well.

- hasn't done it yet; premature.
- biggest problem area in terms of noncompliance with terms of poppy eradication goals is Achin in Nangarhar Province.

Who does UNDCP deal with?

- used to deal with commanders, now wants to deal with "community leaders" (some of whom are former commanders, e.g. Haji Qadir, who is governor of a three-province region in Nangarhar.
- try to secure the agreement of the community to reduce production. Not in the form of a contract, but attempt to do it on the basis of mutual trust.
- do not attempt to write in or agree on specific time frames.
- to travel, make arrangements with commanders and leaders; escorts by commanders of local NGOs), missions cleared by Kabul.
- UNDCP has a regular pool of NGOs as implementing partners (NGO comes to UNDCP with a specific geographic area and project....).

How does UNDCP determine goals and compliance?

- can ask them to stop, but can't force them to stop; for now, Pryce prefers the persuasive gentler approach to stricter enforcement. (Last year, Pryce withdrew support for new projects in Achin Province in Nangarhar (region controlled by Commander Lowani who recently had his foot blown off by a mine) because poppy cultivation had actually gone up while UNDCP funded three schools there.)
- not at all clear what, if anything the new government in Kabul is doing organizationally on drug issue (under Najibullah, there was a State High Commission for Drugs, chaired by General Rafi (?), one of the vice-presidents).
- FAO is currently working on an aerial "crop survey" of the entire country for UNDCP and will attempt a

comparative analysis of satellite imagery going back to 1971. Study will look for trends in forest degradation, cropping patterns, irrigation systems, etc..

- difficulties - problems with cloud cover, survey must be done during flowering period, need good ground information from UNDCP for "ground-truthing".
- for "ground-truthing", use hand-held GPS (global positioning system) units (Magellan). First enter latitude and longitude coordinates. They must first contain an "almanac" (timetable for all the satellites - downloads from one satellite the positions and schedules of all the other satellites). Can do three-dimensional (latitude, longitude, altitude) work if it can find 4 satellites, or two-dimensional work if it can find three satellites.
- FAO is purchasing historical imagery from LANDSAT and French satellite to do the historical comparisons (providing baseline data on cultivation patterns and quantities).
- FAO expects to have two reports completed by the end of August, one on opium and the other on general crops. Plan to present paper at the September 21-23 Islamabad conference ("technical consultation" being held at Levitsky's behest). UNDCP hopes to have FAO re-run the aerial survey every year).

(Historical satellite imagery comparisons of refugee-occupied areas show an extraordinary decrease in forest cover).

Irrigation projects? Concern because most poppies are grown on irrigated land?

-no way to control it other than by monitoring.

Does monitoring work?

- Example - disciplining of a CRA project in Hachem (lost control of their fertilizer, used in November 1991 for poppy cultivation, detected by monitors) - UNDCP, UNDP, FAO didn't pay for projects, froze all further aid through CRA.
- monitoring done physically. Rarely a day or week when there's not someone in the country.
- there is joint monitoring of each other's interests by all UN agencies.

UNDCP staff

There are two Afghan monitoring officers for cross-border projects, two Afghans for drug awareness program, one UN Volunteer (Ethiopian), Andy Pryce. (Hoping to get another position for women's drug awareness program).

Projects by UNDCP Peshawar office

- for 1989-1990 crop year - no projects
- for 1990-1991, two projects in Achin in Nangarhar ("disasters" - one of them with Shelter Now International), and five projects in Badakhshan.
- now 50 cross-border supply-side projects (largest a \$200,000 project, one \$100,000, most of them \$20,000.).
- UNDCP trial project - nitrogen fixation through leguminous trees in Badakhshan (successful in Africa, looking for hardy species for AF); leaves used for cattle fodder, trees provide shade for vegetable growing when planted in alleys about four metres wide. (Bob Mangam, Afghanaid, works on project).
- CRU process for unpalatable agricultural residue (put into pit, sprinkle with some urea fertilizer, cover with plastic, wait six weeks to soften fibres and then feed to animals in winter (successfully done with maize stalks in N. Nigeria) (also sorghum) - good for areas with snow cover.
- roads - funding a road-building project at Dubala (sp?) in Nangarhar in a poppy-growing valley - poppy-growing stopped for 50-100 metres on either side of the road.

What approaches do not work?

- making farmers sign poppy contracts
- "targeting farmer directly not the best answer"
- try income substitution/community development approach; work through the community of which the farmers are a part, try to use peer pressure. Try to impress upon them that money from poppies does not go to development or infrastructure (poppies don't yield real benefits; poppy farmers remain relatively poor; better money goes to the processors and they don't spend it in Afghanistan). Also try to convince them through awareness projects.

(jerib - just less than half an acre or about one-fifth hectare) (recent problems - drought? - in Badakhshan have led to

a substantial decrease in yield - one farmer said he was only getting two pounds of opium per jerib vs. former production of 15 pounds).

What about provision of free wheat?

- respect WFP mandate to deliver food relief, but free wheat only makes sense in famine relief situations. WFP now provides wheat in food for work projects (at the rate of 7 kgs of wheat per day). Not a good idea to give away wheat, use only in emergency.
- "definite linkage and definite concern" about provision of free wheat and poppy growing, but it's "too simplistic" to assume a universal linkage.
- believes should make an example of some areas - e.g. no food for work programs in high poppy-growing areas (e.g. Hachem ?, where 80% of the crop is poppy). Will be based on evaluation next harvest season.
- have fact sheet in process.

Impact of refugee return on opium poppy cultivation?

- expected to have an adverse impact and it's accepted that it has had such an impact.
- efforts on the demand reduction side (awareness campaign - posters and information at border crossings).

Awareness Creation Campaign (ACC)

- Dari and Pashtu pamphlets on the evils of drugs (role of doctor, teacher, mullah, community development worker). (Rough estimate is that 15% of men between 18 and 35 in the camps are addicted to opium or heroin in some form).
- one-week training courses for teachers, doctors, mullahs, etc. (will have a similar course for community leaders in Nov. on recognizing and helping addicts; the debilitating impact that drugs have on family and community (have manuals for courses)).
- women's training component (done at request of mullahs and tribal elders) - addiction spreading among women. Had a training program for Turkmen women. Big addiction problem in Ismaili areas and some of the larger cities (Kabul, Jalalabad, Faizabad). Addiction among women has potential for severe snowballing effect

with baby and child addicts. UNDCP training female master trainers to go out and train other women. (UNDCP attempting to get a new international staff slot for a women's training officer).

(JPO - Junior Program Officer - on Peshawar staff - a Finnish woman - but she has been away most of the year)

Materials for ACC

- silkscreen and paper posters, shopping bags, rattles, tablecloths (distgeer ?)
- use of mullahs and religious themes (to avoid defacement and to permit placing the posters on mosques).
- abacus sets for schools (one per classroom) with anti-drug message; school notebooks, personal chalkboards.
- buy loudspeakers for mullahs.
- programs for BBC Dari and Pashtu Services ("drug dramas" funded by UNDCP and produced by a consultant)
- will try similar drug programming soon on Kabul Radio (nationwide) and Jalalabad Radio.
- sponsor "events" and competitions in refugee camps - food, sports, anti-drug themes.
- inside Afghanistan, UNDCP has a man who permanently travels from village to village talking to elders about the problems of drugs.
- work with NGOs - e.g. Office of Mine Awareness (OMA) does training on the dangers of mines and includes a drug segment.
- Swedish Committee disseminating info through schools and other facilities.
- UNDCP is beginning an NGO drug training course (training two individuals from each NGO - to ensure their commitment to fighting drug abuse; "trapped" if they don't participate.)

Potential tools - money, force, persuasion. Best approach is persuasion (taking a religious angle and showing that drugs are not just a kafir problem - prove Rasool Akhonzada wrong (he urged his people to grow more poppy because it only hurts the West).

A country's assets are land, labor, and capital. If it persists in drug production, outside capital will be cut off (and drug money doesn't go into building economy). Drug business is a serious misallocation of labor (debilitating for members of the labor force - e.g. poster of man stealing bangles from his wife to buy drugs). Leads to a breakdown in society.

Trainees now mostly going straight back to Afghanistan.

Future - Sept 21-23 Conference in ISB (Levitsky initiative which UNDCP had to pick up).

Pryce's strong recommendation that office stay in Peshawar for 1993. Planning to open sub-offices, first in Jalalabad (talking to Haji Qadir about opening), and then possibly in Faizabad and Qandahar.